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Introduction to Cooperation and deception: From evolution to mechanisms
Issue for the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society

Sarah Brosnan & Redouan Bshary
Nature is full of struggle, as predicted by the theory of evolution through natural selection, yet
there are also paramount examples where individuals help each other. These instances of helping have
been difficult to reconcile with Darwin’s theory because it is not always obvious how individuals are
working for their own direct benefit. Consequently, initial publications that offered solutions to subsets
of the observed cases of helping, such as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) or reciprocity (Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), are among the most influential and most cited papers in evolution /
behavioural ecology. Despite these initial successes, models are often difficult to map on to actions, and
empirical evidence for many proposed solutions is quite sparse. However, during the last few years, a
wave of new studies and concepts has considerably advanced our understanding of the conditions
under which individuals are selected to help others. We therefore think it is timely to bring together the
state of the art concerning our knowledge of helping. Perhaps more importantly, reviewing our current
knowledge should help us to identify the many gaps that still exist in our understanding of helping
behaviour.
Of critical concern is that a large part of the existing theory is relatively poorly matched with
empirical research. There may be several reasons for this mismatch. For example, theorists are often
interested in human behaviour and the various forms of reciprocity that may lead to stable cooperation.
As a consequence, very detailed models exist for these kinds of concepts. However, relatively few
examples of cooperation and mutualism in other species seem to fit reciprocity concepts, as several
contributors to this volume point out (Brosnan et al. this volume; Connor this volume; Leimar &
Hammerstein this volume; Melis & Semmann this volume). Alternative concepts exist (Connor this
volume; Leimar & Hammerstein this volume), but these seem to attract little attention from theorists.
Another reason for the mismatch is that both ecological models and game theoretical models yield
straightforward and seemingly simple cooperative solutions like ‘always help’ or ‘start cooperatively and
then match your partner’s behaviour in subsequent rounds (e.g. Tit For Tat; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981)’.
Despite their simplicity and elegance, which lend a seductive allure, such predictions rarely fit real life
observations, where individuals do not seem to make decisions as precisely as predicted (de Waal &
Suchak this volume) and where strong variation in behaviour is often observed, within individuals,
between individuals and between species (Soares et al. this volume). In fact, the effort to explain such
variation has led to a major new field in behavioural ecology, named ‘animal personality’ (Sih et al. 2004;
Bergmüller et al. this volume; Gosling, 2001). Identifying ultimate and proximate sources of variation
may help theorists to refine their models and hence make them more realistic (McNamara & Leimar this
volume).
Overall, we feel that much important theory is already out there, but that more empirical
studies are needed to help to identify the most important concepts. For example, predictions about how
demography, life history, and ecology affect the evolution and maintenance of helping are well
established (Lehmann & Rousset this volume); what is lacking is empirical support. Thus, there is a clear
need for careful descriptions of the natural history of species as a basis for well informed, and hence
well designed, experiments. Such experiments should test not only the evolutionary theory, but also the
mechanisms (cognitive, physiological, etc) underlying cooperative behaviour. A detailed understanding
of the mechanisms will provide key information for a new generation of more nuanced models.

Mechanisms are important to specify trade-offs and constraints. For example, in most models there are
a variety of typical assumptions, such as the assumptions that individuals have perfect memory, that
gaining information is cost free, or that each individual is able to perform all different behavioural
options investigated. These assumptions are unlikely to be realistic for any empirical example, and the
conclusions that emerge from more realistic assumptions change the predictions of the models
(McNamara & Leimar this volume).
Understanding the costs of information and associated trade-offs and constraints are
particularly important for a full appreciation of how cooperating and avoiding cooperation (cheating) are
– or are not – linked to the evolution of cognition and hence brain structure and brain size (Brosnan et
al. this volume). Cooperating and cheating are closely intertwined, and it is unlikely that one can be
understood in the absence of the other. This view emerges repeatedly in the contributions to this
volume. Similarly, one can ask under which conditions stable cooperation is best achieved through
‘positive’ mechanisms that reward cooperative behaviour, versus when ‘negative’ mechanisms that
handle non-cooperative partners through sanctioning, punishing, or abandoning them may be the best
options to promote helping. Negative mechanisms may easily promote cooperative behaviour by one
partner but the outcome is not necessarily beneficial for all interacting individuals. Distinguishing
sanctions and punishment of cheaters from coercion and parasitism remains a challenging topic for
empiricists (Jensen this volume).
When we planned the content of this volume, our goal was to make sure that the general
opinions voiced above were reflected in the contributions. Purely theoretical papers are in the minority;
instead the emphasis was placed on empirical but nevertheless conceptual papers. More specifically, we
felt that the major theoretical debates on group selection / cultural group selection versus inclusive
fitness theory are well covered elsewhere, and that these positions are already clearly defined. We
therefore avoid this topic in our volume, and focus on the ecological and game theoretical approaches
instead. Lehmann & Rousset (this volume) demonstrate how demography, life history and ecology may
promote or hinder the evolution of helping by natural selection without explicitly distinguishing
between direct and indirect fitness benefits or within-group and between-group competition. Similarly,
de Waal & Suchak (this volume) and Jaeggi et al. (this volume) discuss helping (other regarding)
behaviour in other cooperative species, including cooperatively breeding species, without trying to split
natural selection into these sub-units. Thinking holistically in terms of natural selection may be one way
around the theoretical discussions. Nevertheless, biologists have been trained in the inclusive fitness
framework and the relative importance of indirect versus direct fitness benefits (altruism versus
cooperation) has been a key topic for empiricists. The realisation that relatedness per se does not allow
the conclusion that helping is due to an increase in indirect fitness (West et al. 2002, Lehmann &
Rousset this volume) has led to an increased emphasis on direct benefits in cooperatively breeding
species like meerkats (Clutton-Brock 2002), and the development of various concepts that strongly
resemble or extend established game theoretic concepts of cooperation (Bergmüller et al. 2007).
Measuring precisely the combined effects of direct and indirect fitness benefits of helping will be a
major challenge for future studies. We refer interested readers to another recent edited Philosophical
Transactions volume (Clutton-Brock et al. 2009) where contributors explored how direct and indirect
fitness benefits interact in the formation of societies.
For the empirical chapters, we asked contributors to make their points using a broad taxonomic
approach whenever feasible. Helping is widespread in nature, ranging from plants to insects, and from
bacteria to humans. Examples from all major taxonomic groups exist, and comparing the evidence
across a range of taxa may reveal important information about the generality or specificity of many of

the concepts that are developed. Overall, we think that the various contributions provide major
advances in understanding how cooperation, helping, and deception actually manifest in nature and
identify major future research areas with respect to four general issues. First, it is of paramount
importance to study in detail (and then incorporate) the natural history of one’s study species. Second,
we need to better integrate disciplines and research areas that currently focus on other topics into the
study of cooperation. Third, we have to study mechanisms underlying behaviour and decision making.
Finally, we need to better understand the degree to which helping - and also cheating and deception are linked to the evolution of cognitive abilities, as well as the degree to which human cooperation may
differ from other species. For further discussions of several important aspects related to this question
we also refer interested readers to an edited Philosophical Transactions volume by Emery et al. (2007).
Before we summarize the major topics in this volume, we must deal briefly with terminology.
Given the plethora of definitions for cooperation, altruism, and other terms in the field, confusion may
emerge simply because of the ways different authors use the same terms, or use different terms for the
same behaviour. In an effort to provide a coherent volume not only with respect to content but also
with respect to terminology, we asked our contributors to use our definitions for the most basic terms,
derived from an evolutionary approach as described in Bshary & Bergmüller (2008), and to specify how
any additional terms relate to these foundational definitions. By linking all of our papers under a
common definitional framework, we provide readers a chance to see how ideas tie together in a way
that is not possible when different definitions are used. The definitions summarised below cannot cover
all aspects of helping, and authors were asked to provide definitions for additional terms or extensions
of our terms in their chapters whenever necessary.
1) Helping: this is the most general term and simply implies that an individual on average increases
the fitness of a recipient. There are no assumptions about the costs or benefits to the helper.
2) Cooperative behaviour: a behaviour that on average increases the fitness of a recipient and
which is under positive selection if it on average increases the inclusive fitness of the actor via
direct fitness benefits.
3) Altruistic behaviour: a behaviour that on average increases the fitness of a recipient and which is
under positive selection if it on average increases the inclusive fitness of the actor via indirect
fitness benefits. This has also been called ‘biological altruism’. Some contributors distinguish
this ‘ultimate altruism’ from what might be considered ‘proximate’ altruism, or, as it is often
called, psychological altruism, which is defined by its underlying psychological mechanism, i. e.
empathy / other-regarding behaviour. Psychological altruism does not ask how helping
translates into fitness benefits.
4) Cooperation: 2(n) partners increase on average their direct fitness due to the interaction.
5) Cheating: a behaviour that increases the immediate payoff of the actor and reduces the
immediate payoff of the recipient. Cheating thus differs from deception, which implies a
manipulation of the partner. Deception and cheating do not necessarily co-occur (although they
may do so).
6) Spite: a behaviour which decreases the direct fitness of both the actor and the recipient. Such
behaviour may evolve if it increases the inclusive fitness of the actor via indirect fitness benefits.
Similarly to altruistic behaviour, there must be a careful discrimination between ‘biological’ or
‘ultimate’ spite and ‘proximate’ spite. The latter is based on the motivation to hurt someone
else, without asking the question how that may translate into fitness benefits.
7) Other-regarding behaviour: This term has recently been used to describe helping behaviour,
where the motivation to help is based on empathy rather than on calculations how it might yield
benefits to the actor.

Note that we find it essential to distinguish between individual behaviours and the outcome of
interactions when we talk about cooperation (again, see Bshary & Bergmüller, 2008, for more detail).
Similarly, it is essential to distinguish ultimate function from proximate mechanisms; in both cases,
mixing up the two can lead to misunderstandings. While we kept the definitions short, it is worthwhile
to point out that West et al. (2007) included an important addition to the definition of cooperative
behaviour (‘mutual benefits’ in their terminology), namely that the behaviour should in part be under
selection because of its positive effect on the recipient. With this addition one can exclude cases like
elephants defecating and thereby providing by-product benefits to dung beetles that would otherwise
fit the definition of cooperation.
The results of the volume
1. On the importance of knowing the natural history of one’s study species
Only detailed knowledge about ecology and interaction patterns will allow informed guesses
about the game structure in which individuals are engaged (n interactions, behavioural options, payoff
matrix, etc) and, hence, how helping may increase the actors inclusive fitness. Demography, life history
and ecology will be particularly important to understanding differences among species, but also among
populations (Lehmann & Rousset this volume). The various game theoretic concepts presented primarily
in Leimar & Hammerstein (this volume) and Connor (this volume), all implicitly make assumptions about
the variables discussed in Lehmann & Rousset in order to construct payoff matrices for the various
behavioural options considered. Most importantly, however, models cannot make informed
assumptions about trade-offs or constraints if these are not identified by empiricists. For example, the
question whether interactions take place in front of bystanders and whether or not bystanders pay
attention to these interactions is foremost an empirical question (Earley this volume), where the
absence of any form of indirect reciprocity might be due to cognitive constraints or trade-offs between
the benefits of acquiring information and the costs. One possibility is that the benefits of information
collection will outweigh the costs only if inter-individual variation is high (McNamara & Leimar this
volume).
A prime example how ecology can be linked to the evolution of helping and to the evolution of
specific mechanisms concerns reproductive systems. One emerging hypothesis is that cooperative
breeders are more helpful than other, closely related, species due to the unusual constraints, and
resulting interdependency, of their breeding system (Jaeggi et al, this volume). Under these
circumstances, helping other group members becomes more unconditional on the recipients’ behaviour
than might otherwise be the case. Indeed, one possibility which seems likely is that other-regarding
(prosocial) motivations evolved (Jaeggi et al. this volume, de Waal & Suchak this volume) to provide a
proximate mechanism that allows individuals to give away resources unconditionally in situations in
which it is in their ultimate (if not immediate) benefit to do so.
2. Integrating new disciplines into the study of cooperation
Three papers introduce disciplines that we believe are of major importance for an integrative
understanding of helping, but which currently focus on other questions: animal personalities,
behavioural endocrinology, and communication network theory. The observation that individuals
consistently differ with respect to behaviour has attracted great interest in the last several years
(Gosling 2001; Sih et al. 2004). The focus of research, however, has been on the boldness – shyness axis

and on aggression. Given that inter-individual variation in behaviour may also be a key factor promoting
cooperation (McNamara & Leimar this volume), Bergmüller et al. (this volume) explore the applicability
of the concept of animal personalities to cooperation. One important prediction is that it is likely that
cooperation emerges in context with other behaviours (behavioural syndromes), and thus that only a
broad observational approach across contexts will yield a complete explanation of the variation
between individual levels of cooperation.
The chapter by Soares et al (this volume) explores the potential role of hormones in explaining
differences in levels of helping within individuals, between individuals and between species, linking
endocrinology to personality differences. Similarly to the field of animal personality, behavioural
endocrinology has had a major focus on aggression, but may benefit studies of cooperation. The chapter
also explains the many potential pitfalls with respect to experimental design and interpretation of
results one has to consider if one intends to manipulate hormones levels. Empathy, pair bonding and
other mechanisms that promote helping surely have an endocrinological component (e.g. the evidence
for the effect of oxytocin on both human and non-human social behaviour; Lim et al, 2006; Kosfeld et al,
2005).
Finally, research on communication networks has rarely focussed on cooperation (McGregor
2005). However, the fact that eavesdropping by bystanders in communication networks has been
documented in a wide array of taxa, including invertebrates, makes it likely that image scoring and
behaviour adjustments to being observed (‘audience effects’) may also occur frequently in the context
of cooperation. Earley (this volume) argues that the presence of bystanders may provide a strong
selective force on decisions to cooperate, a force which is not currently considered in an appropriate
way.
3. The need to study mechanisms underlying behaviour and decision making.
We expect that the study of mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour and decision making
processes in general are most likely to impact our understanding of cooperation in nature, especially in
dialogue with emerging theoretical models that take new evidence into account. Mechanisms can be
studied on many different levels, be it ontogeny, physiology, endocrinology, learning, cognition,
processes in the brain, genetics, interactions between genes and environment, etc. It is clear that we are
on the cusp of major advances in understanding these mechanisms. New ideas for proximate
mechanisms, at the level of both causation and ontogeny, are emerging to explain where cooperative
behaviour does – and does not – occur.
For instance, there has been a move away from the idea of a calculated, precise model of
reciprocal investment towards one based on rules of thumb and emotional valence (Brosnan et al, this
volume; de Waal & Suchak, this volume). This move opens the possibility of explaining cooperation in a
wider variety of species and situations, and may provide explanations for clearly cooperative
interactions that nonetheless do not meet traditional game theoretic rules (e.g. Tit for Tat). Along with
this, there is a greater interest in how individuals develop cooperative behaviour. This may emerge as a
result of a genetically determined strategy, a learned behavioural strategy (e.g. associative learning), or
higher cognition (Brosnan et al, this volume). Of course, many potential mechanisms may function at
several of these levels (e.g. empathy may be the result of genetic causation linked with learning during
ontogeny).

Moreover, although there are some notable exceptions, in many cases we know little about the
decision making process underlying cooperation. In many cases this may overlap with behavioural
mechanisms; for instance, although it is often assumed that individuals make explicit calculations about
their decisions, there are remarkably few instances in which this has been documented. Instead, it
seems likely that individuals are following rules of thumb, including those based on emotional valence
and preferences for individuals (e.g. friendships; Brosnan et al, this volume). Moreover, it is often
unknown what information individuals are using to make decisions. They should be able to access their
own state, but may also be able to incorporate information from the environment or from other’s
outcomes (e.g. social comparison; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). Understanding how individuals make
decisions, and how they are affected by the physical and social environments, will help us better predict
and understand when cooperation occurs and when it does not.
4. Linking cooperation, cheating and deception to the evolution of cognitive abilities, and implications
for the ‘uniqueness’ of human cooperation
A topic that is paramount in the current cooperation literature and will without doubt remain hot for
quite some time is the question how human cooperation differs from that of other species (Melis &
Semmann, this volume). Although there are a range of assumptions (de Waal, 2005; Fehr, Fischbacher,
& Gachter, 2002), the general consensus seems to be that we differ from other species to some degree,
but with clear evolutionary continuities. In some ways, we might stand apart further in the realm of
deception and spite than cooperation (Jensen this volume). What is the cause of those differences is still
a matter for debate.
One possibility that has been put forth is that humans have a tendency to help others (e.g.
other-regarding preferences) which is beyond the scope of other species (Silk et al., 2005; Jensen, this
volume). On the other hand, evidence for these preferences have been found in other species, leading
to two hypotheses, one more functional and the other more mechanistic (and thus, not mutually
exclusive). First, it is possible that other-regarding preferences have evolved in cooperatively breeding
species because their unique suite of life history characteristics leads to significant interdependency and
thus increased opportunities for selection due to inclusive fitness (Jaeggi et al, this volume). Second, it
may be that (one of) the proximate mechanism behind such preferences is empathy, which in at least
some forms may be widespread in the animal kingdom (de Waal & Suchak, this volume).
Other possibilities focus on the differences in magnitude or kind in other behaviours which in
turn affect cooperation. For instance, although many other species show evidence of behavioural
traditions, or cultures (e.g. Fragaszy & Perry, 2003; Heyes & Galef, 1996; Zentall & Galef, 1988; Emery et
al. 2007), human culture seems to be of a greater magnitude. Since culture is known to affect
cooperation, even in individuals for whom basic criteria like age, level of education, etc. are similar
(Gächter et al., this volume), humans may have an advantage in structuring interactions, relationships,
and institutions to favour cooperation. Humans also possess language, allowing them to communicate
about other individuals more efficiently than other species (although see Connor, this volume, for
evidence in dolphins). This may lead to more efficient communication networks in humans, and
increased opportunities for indirect learning, such as through reputations, than is available for other
species (Earley, this volume). For a more detailed discussion on the evolution of societies including
humans, we refer the reader to an edited volume by Clutton-Brock et al. (2009).Finally, the very
destructiveness of humans’ behaviour may lead to increased cooperation, if the seeds of cooperation
are sown through the hyper-competitiveness and spite seen in human societies (Jensen, this volume).

Conclusion
It is clear that we are at an exciting time in the study of cooperation. After years of attempting
to explain cooperation using fairly basic, dyadic models assuming static individuals (both
developmentally within the same individual and across different individuals), we are beginning to
understand the importance of variation at all levels in understanding cooperation. In large part this is
the result of a move away from a reliance on the Prisoner’s dilemma as the main concept to explain
cooperative behaviour (Leimar & Hammerstein, this volume), a concurrent acknowledgement that
cooperation may involve more than two individuals (Connor, this volume; Earley, this volume), and,
again, an increased recognition of the importance of life history and ecology in understanding
cooperation (McNamara & Leimar, this volume; Lehmann & Rousset, this volume). As theory develops,
it will be important for empiricists to follow with explicit tests of hypotheses and models, so that the
theory can be further refined. The ideas presented by the authors of this volume represent, in many
ways, the revolutionary new approach to studying behaviour which is currently underway.
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